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When I was invited to write a short piece for the catalog of a staging of 
The Trial, I argued that Franz Kafka’s laughter enacts a critique of the 
prevalent concept of freedom as the free will of the individual, which 
has dominated both the political and the philosophical tradition in the 
Occident.1 I had not anticipated the reaction this position would provoke. 
Several posts on blogs as well as personal communications informed me 
in no uncertain terms that the idea is preposterous: Not only is Kafka’s 
world so overdetermined by tragedy that humor has no place in it, but 
Kafka’s is a world of imprisonment where freedom is totally absent. This 
book is not so much a direct reply to these protestations against my short 
piece in the theater catalog, as a response to certain ingrained presup-
positions about Kafka’s work—and especially its “tragic” aspect, of which 
the replies to my short piece were symptomatic. I continue to maintain, 
and I develop here in some detail, that Kafka’s humor is a response to the 
Western conception of freedom, which he tirelessly presents in this narra-
tives, and that this response implies an alternative conception of freedom. 
It is not unusual to talk about Kafka’s humor. Those who knew him 
personally draw attention to the humor that characterized the person and 
that subsequently informed the work. There are, for instance, several refer-
ences to Kafka’s humor in Max Brod’s biography. The most famous one is 
the following description of Kafka’s reading of The Trial at a literary salon 
in Prague: “When Kafka read aloud himself, his humor became particu-
larly clear. Thus, for example, we friends of his laughed quite immod-
erately when he first let us hear the first chapter of The Trial. And he 
himself laughed so much that there were moments he couldn’t read any 
further. Astonishing enough, when you think of the fearful e arnestness 
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of this chapter. But that is how it was. Certainly it was not entirely good, 
comfortable laughter.”2 Brod is typical of Kafka scholarship in that he cites 
references that support a kind of laughter in Kafka, but he has no idea 
of how to integrate this laughter into the analysis of the texts themselves, 
other than by transforming its significance into a “higher” or “deeper” 
register. Thus, Brod subjugates this “not entirely comfortable laughter” to 
his own theological interpretation, which views Kafka as a kind of saint 
of modernity—as I will show in more detail in chapter 2.
A second, good example of this same maneuver is Felix Weltsch’s 
Religion und Humor im Leben und Werk Franz Kafkas. Weltsch, who knew 
Kafka personally, introduces humor by saying that it is “totally impossible” 
to ignore it for anyone who knew Kafka. Soon, however, Weltsch quali-
fies this humor by saying that it is not lighthearted entertainment, but 
rather a “serious” humor that can thereby be linked to religion without 
any contradiction.3 At the end, humor becomes a symptom of something 
else that is more profound. Kafka’s laughter is presented as a reaction to 
something else that is more important, and never as producing ideas with 
literary as well as political import.
A significant advance over this uncomfortable transformation of 
laughter into theology is the argument that Kafka collapses the distinc-
tion between comedy and tragedy. Thus, for instance, Milan Kundera 
writes: “In the world of the Kafkan, the comic is not a counterpoint to the 
tragic (the tragi-comic) as in Shakespeare; it’s not there to make the tragic 
more bearable by lightening the tone; it doesn’t accompany the tragic, not 
at all, it destroys it in the egg and thus deprives the victims of the only 
consolation they could hope for: the consolation to be found in the (real 
or supposed) grandeur of tragedy.”4 And yet, despite its significance in 
relation to the earlier interpretations of Kafka’s laughter, this insight does 
not say much more than that Kafka is a modernist author in the sense 
that modernism is concerned with the erasure of what is traditionally 
categorized as high art and fascinated with the mixing of genres. After 
all, as Mikhail Bakhtin shows in his study of Rabelais, laughter has always 
destabilized hierarchies, of both genre and power—notwithstanding the 
difficulty of drawing a demarcation line between the two.
More fruitful approaches to Kafka’s laughter are concerned with the 
broader philosophical and political significance of laughter. I am think-
ing here, for instance, both of Walter Benjamin and of Gilles Deleuze 
and Felix Guattari, who place a significant emphasis on laughter—as I 
will show in chapters 1 and 2. To understand such broader philosophical 
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significance, we can recall Umberto Eco’s The Name of the Rose (1980), 
which dramatizes the repression of laughter in Western metaphysics. The 
reason this repression takes place can be easily gleaned by turning to Zara-
thustra’s thunderous laughter. This laughter that Nietzsche describes had a 
determinative importance for his French interpreters precisely because of 
its metaphysical significance. To put it very simply, one can laugh at the 
idea that something transcendent determines our being. Simon Critchley 
puts it thus: “What makes us laugh . . . is the return of the physical into 
the metaphysical, where the pretended tragical sublimity of the human 
collapses into a comic ridiculousness which is perhaps even more trag-
ic.”5 We can already glimpse the resonance of this conception of laughter 
within Kafka’s stories. The Metamorphosis depicts the transformation of a 
human into a filthy insect. Such a transformation laughs at the idea that 
we—in our bodily existence—are made “in the image of God,” while it 
remains tragic because of the transvaluation that the human has thereby 
undergone.
The problem with such an approach to Kafka’s laughter is that it 
remains too broad. By contrast, my own approach narrows down the 
scope of laughter. This is to deny neither the generic implications of laugh-
ter noted by Kundera and others, nor the use of laughter in countering 
the Western metaphysical tradition. Rather, it is to show that laughter 
functions as a technical device with important discursive implications—
in particular, implications that relate to how freedom is thought of in 
Kafka’s writing.
In sum, my approach places humor at the center of Kafka’s tech-
nique, which relies on plots in which the protagonists are seemingly 
totally deprived of their freedom. I argue that if there is political think-
ing in Kafka, this is only possible because of his laughter.6 The reason is 
that Kafka’s laughter is the tool he uses to deconstruct power. One of the 
most critical ways in which power is constructed depends on how we 
understand our freedom. As Foucault puts it, “power is exercised only 
over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free. . . . [F]reedom must 
exist for power to be exerted.”7 Freedom can be the means of our entrap-
ment by power. The key to the exercise of power through freedom is the 
free will. We think that we have the freedom to exercise our will only by 
forgetting that power is exercised not simply by delimiting our freedom, 
but by confining our will to power’s own operation and perpetuation. The 
more we exercise our free will, the more power proliferates. Hence, it is 
an illusion to think that we are free because we have a free will.
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Kafka—I argue in this book—laughs at our illusion that we have 
a free will. And he also laughs at the correlate of the free will, namely, 
the separation between a world of ideal freedom and a fallen world of 
confinement. This separation corresponds to the metaphysical assump-
tion that there is a spiritual realm that is separate from, and higher than, 
the material or corporeal realm. The question of the free will is always 
about how to connect these two worlds or these two realms—it is always 
about how our conceptions of “what we will” can come into being. The 
transcendence of an ideal world of freedom or of spirit is necessary for 
the free will to operate. As such, and pace interpreters such as Brod and 
Weltsch, Kafka’s laughter performs also a critique of transcendence as the 
linchpin of both Western metaphysics and theology.8 At the same time, 
this laughter is not only critical, but has a constructive aspect. Kafka’s 
laughter suggests a different sense of freedom. This is a situated freedom—
or mediated freedom, as I call it—that does not rely on ideals separated 
from the here and now. It is a freedom from the free will.
Let me describe the main idea in a different way. Mladen Dolar 
makes an astute observation about the presence of freedom and unfree-
dom in Kafka. After noting that “there is unfreedom everywhere in his 
[Kafka’s] universe,” Dolar insists that, nevertheless, “freedom is there at all 
times, everywhere, it is Kafka’s fin mot, like the secret word one doesn’t 
dare to utter although it is constantly on one’s mind. The freedom that 
might not look like much, that might actually look wretched, but is there 
at all points, and once we spot it there is no way of going away from it, it 
is a possession to hold on to, it is the permanent line of flight, or rather 
the line of pursuit.”9 The present study can be understood as developing 
this observation by breaking down the question of freedom in Kafka into 
three distinct questions. First, what kind of unfreedom enchains Kafka’s 
characters? The answer I will propose is that unfreedom is inextricable 
from the free will. Second, what kind of freedom is present in Kafka? 
The answer is a freedom from the free will—or as I also call it, mediated 
freedom. Third, how is the interaction between freedom and unfreedom 
presented? My contention is that laughter provides the means for this 
interaction and thus is central in how—technically—Kafka presents free-
dom and the free will.
My reading of this idea of the freedom from the will in Kafka rests 
on one important insight, namely, that the idea of the free will is tightly 
connected with the idea of the separation between an ideal world of free-
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dom and a fallen world in which the human is imprisoned. This insight 
organizes the structure of the book:
I will show in chapter 1 how the conjunction between the idea 
of the free will and the separation of a paradisiacal world of freedom 
from a fallen world is developed by Augustine in his relating of the Fall. 
Kafka’s own persistent return to narratives of confinement—narratives in 
which the protagonist is completely trapped and unable to exercise his 
free will—is counterbalanced by the idea of a space of complete freedom, 
best exemplified by the Nature Theater of Oklahoma in the last chapter of 
Amerika. Nevertheless, as I will show, Kafka actually laughs at the actors 
who are supposedly liberated. This will provide an ontological setting for 
the ideal of freedom from the free will.
Chapter 2 approaches Kafka’s laughter from Maurice Blanchot’s sug-
gestion that Kafka resembles a comic presentation of Abraham, according 
to which Abraham is stranded in the desert because he is called by God to 
sacrifice his son, whereas in fact he is childless. I show how Kafka exploits 
the comical elements of the impossible task of pleasing a transcendent 
entity by reading closely “The Judgment” and The Metamorphosis. Chapter 
2 will explore how the idea of the freedom from the free will also provides 
an exegetical matrix for reading Kafka.
The contrast between absolute imprisonment and absolute freedom 
is most clearly presented in the two short stories where the protagonists 
are literally encaged, “A Report to an Academy” and “A Hunger Artist,” 
which I will discuss in chapter 3. I will show how they form a critique of 
the Western metaphysical tradition of the thinking of freedom by making 
Kafka’s laughter resonate with the thought of Levinas and Spinoza and 
thus how it can be inscribed in an ethical register.
The function of the law in Kafka’s writings, especially those from 
around 1914, the year of the broken engagement with Felice Bauer as well 
of the writing of The Trial, is often viewed as paradigmatic of the fallen, 
imprisoned world in Kafka. This does not preclude, however, the eruption 
of the Kafkaesque laughter in the moment of the greatest—seemingly—
deprivation of freedom, as I will demonstrate in chapter 4. Laughter is 
also operative in the legal domain.
Ultimately, as I will argue in chapter 5, Kafka’s reconceptualization of 
freedom as freedom from the free will has profound implications for how 
power is conceptualized. I will demonstrate this by contrasting Kafka’s “In 
the Penal Colony” to Michel Foucault’s description of the execution of 
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Damiens at the beginning of Discipline and Punish. The laughter at the 
illusion of the free will is, finally, situated in the political sphere.
This trajectory does not present Kafka as a political philosopher per 
se—since he did not develop a systematic theory, as would be expected 
from a philosopher. Rather, I show that Kafka offers invaluable insights 
to political philosophy about the function of freedom—insights that the 
disciplinary demands for systematic presentation may actually obstruct, 
occlude, and obscure.10 And this makes it all the more valuable to recog-
nize what Kafka laughs at: namely, the conjunction between the free will 
and the separation of a world of absolute liberation from a fallen world. 
And, further, it makes it more valuable to ponder the Kafkaesque insight 
that freedom may only be possible when we liberate ourselves from the 
free will.
I should note here that several attempts have been made to present 
Kafka’s “politics.” These have been aptly documented by Bill Dodd.11 For 
the most part, they attempt to situate Kafka within the political debates of 
his time. The questions typically asked are what historical events and theo-
retical works may have influenced his political views and his thought—an 
exception here is Adorno’s masterful “Notes on Kafka.” Further, as Dodd 
observes, “much of this ‘political’ reading of Kafka has been engaged in 
the task of rescuing him from the aura of a homo religiosus with which 
Brod influentially announced him to the world.”12 I would like to point to 
two important articles that do not fit Dodd’s observation in a straightfor-
ward way, but at the same time do not contradict it. First, as Peter Fenves 
has shown in a brilliant reading of the short fragment “Die besitzlose 
Arbeiterschaft”—a favorite with many political readings—the political 
interpretation of Kafka has the capacity to radically affect the way that 
the religious itself is thought of in his work. In this context, the religious is 
not simply opposed to the political.13 This implies a premise of the present 
study, namely that the religious is not innocently separated from politi-
cal commitments. Consequently, as I show, Brod’s metaphysical reading 
has political repercussions, which include the construction of freedom, 
a central political concept par excellence. Second, as Judith Butler has 
demonstrated, the “political” in relation to Kafka cannot avoid tackling 
questions about the ownership of the proper name “Kafka,” especially in 
the context of his manuscripts. Differently put, the political in Kafka is not 
confined to his political opinions or thoughts, but also relates to how the 
proper name “Kafka” has been mobilized in different political contexts.14 
I agree with this insight, even though the approach adopted in the pres-
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ent study is different, not only in that it concentrates in discovering the 
political in Kafka’s texts themselves, but also in that I am concerned with 
one question—the issue of the presence of the free will in the midst of 
the most suffocating plots of confinement.
As the above suggests, I will present this idea of mediated freedom, 
or the freedom from the will, by reading selected Kafka texts in conjunc-
tion with the way that freedom has be theorized about in philosophy. 
Three caveats are necessary at this point: First, I do not intend to conduct 
here a holistic interpretation of Kafka. I am not offering a “key” that 
“unlocks” any “deeper” meanings of his entire oeuvre. Instead, I trace 
one idea—how Kafkaesque humor is tied up with political thinking, and 
in particular with thinking of freedom as free from the free will. And I 
do so by concentrating on a relatively small number of texts by Kafka. 
Second, I do not suggest that the entirety of Kafka’s oeuvre needs to be 
read from the perspective of the interplay between laughter and freedom. 
There are innumerable other ways to approach his writings. I am contend-
ing, however, that a reading of Kafka’s text that is concerned with their 
political significant cannot avoid dealing with Kafka’s laughter. Third, I 
do not propose here a comprehensive theory of freedom. There are sev-
eral philosophical issues that I have chosen to ignore. The reason is that 
I choose to concentrate on the constellation that laughter and freedom 
construct—a constellation that is illuminating about certain aspects of 
freedom but far from exhaustive of a philosophy of freedom.15
In addition, I want to allude to a further aspect, which I cannot 
take up here—not only because it would have made for an entirely dif-
ferent book but more crucially because I do not pretend to comprehend 
its implications. This has to do with the importance of the figure of 
confinement within the institution of literature. If we take a step back 
to contemplate some of the foundational texts of the literary canon, we 
cannot help but be struck by the crucial position of confinement plots. 
Thus, for instance, such a plot can be found in some of the first novels, 
such as Boccaccio’s Decameron—where ten people narrate stories while 
they are confined to a villa for ten days to shelter themselves from the 
plague. Cervantes’s Don Quixote, the narrative that inaugurates Hispanic 
literature, can also be read as a narrative of confinement, as Kafka’s own 
reworking shows—a fragment that I discuss in chapter 1. And we can go 
much further back, all the way to the Homeric epics, first with the Greek 
army stranded at Troy and then with the desire for the nostos, which 
determines all of Ulysses’s actions while his wife, Penelope, is trapped in 
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the Ithacan palace waiting for his return. There is certainly something 
significant that connects plot development and confinement. And even if 
it is not the place here to investigate this relation, the crucial role of the 
plots of confinement historically suggests that the choice to concentrate on 
Kafka’s plots of confinement is not a marginal issue in a modernist author 
from a provincial city in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, but a significant 
aspect of the institution of literature.
This brings me to the most significant, as well as the thorniest, 
methodological issue. It concerns the relation between literature and phi-
losophy. I do not believe in the idea of “philosophical fiction” if what is 
meant by this is that there are certain fictional texts that can give us privi-
leged access to certain ideas that in turn can enrich our lives or teach us 
how to live. There are various reasons why I reject this position. First, it 
reproduces the separation that characterizes the Western idea of freedom 
between a fallen world and an ideal world unalloyed with the vicissitudes 
of being. In this conception, the truth-seeking philosophy always occupies 
the position of the ideal, while fiction is harnessed to philosophy’s truths 
like a servant—or a slave. Second, I hold that it reproduces a particular 
philosophical preoccupation, which seeks to unify the conceptual and 
the particular. In this conception, fiction can become the vehicle of this 
unification. Quentin Meillassoux  recently described something like that 
under the concept of correlationism.16 I describe it elsewhere under the 
concept of immediacy.17 In any case, the figure of Kafka’s cages ques-
tions and problematizes the assumption that thought and being can be 
separated. It is no wonder that the greatest critic of this metaphysical 
assumption, Baruch Spinoza, also arrives at a conception of freedom from 
the correlate of this metaphysical separation, namely, the separation of 
freedom and unfreedom. As Genevieve Lloyd and Moira Gatens put it, 
in Spinoza “freedom fundamentally is the emergence from the illusion 
of freedom—that is, from the illusion of free will.”18 It is for this reason 
that I will return to Spinoza on several occasions throughout this book.
One further implication ought to be noted, one that provides further 
reason for rejecting the possibility of “philosophical fiction”: no concept 
is complete or autonomous. This suggests what Peter Szendy calls a “phi-
losofiction”—which is to be strictly distinguished from a “philosophical 
fiction.” According to Szendy, a philosofiction is the fictional element that 
“comes to haunt even the most formally rigorous philosophical works.”19 
In other words, a philosofiction challenges the claim of concepts to occupy 
a space that is outside or beyond where they enjoy complete autonomy. 
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This point resonates with Kafka’s cages. The fictional element dismantles 
the concept’s autonomy in the sense that the concept remains anchored 
to particularity and dependent on singularity. In this sense, philosofic-
tion is the freedom from the aspiration toward idealized values that are 
universal, or of an analysis that produces concepts thoroughly abstracted 
from experience, or the pursuit of truth at the expense of and by reject-
ing myth, or the insistence of a rational capacity that absolutely separates 
the human from the animal—and so on. Ultimately, a philosofiction is 
the liberation from the illusion that thought and being can be separated. 
No wonder that Deleuze insists on a Spinozan laughter that arises from 
the fact that “Spinoza is one of the most cheerful authors in the world.”20 
This is a laughter in the face of all those sad emotions that arise from 
the separation of spirit and being.21 The present book can be read as an 
invitation to join the chorus of this laughter.
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Richard Winston (New York: Schocken, 1960), 178.
 3. The examples here can easily proliferate, but I will mention only one 
more: Henry Sussman observes in “The Burrow” the “blunt literality” characteristic 
of cartoons. See his Franz Kafka: Geometrician of Metaphor (Madison, WI: Coda, 
1979), 154.
 4. I therefore disagree with Bill Dodd, who asserts that “once we accept 
that irony and travesty are part of Kafka’s treatment of religious themes, it 
becomes possible to conceive of the social and political dimensions of his critique 
of metaphysics.” Dodd, “The Case for a Political Reading,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Kafka, ed. Julian Preece, 146. The problem with irony and travesty 
is the assertion of a position of superiority, which ends up reaffirming the very 
politics of metaphysics that it is supposed to overcome. If we substitute “irony and 
